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Abstract  
Marital surname change is a striking example of the survival of tradition. 
A practice emerging from patriarchal history has become embedded in 
an age of de-traditionalisation and women’s emancipation.  Is the 
tradition of women’s marital name change just some sort of inertia or 
drag, which will slowly disappear as modernity progresses, or does this 
tradition fulfil more contemporary roles? Are women and men just 
dupes to tradition, or alternatively do they use tradition to further their 
aims?  We examine how different approaches - individualisation theory, 
new institutionalism and bricolage - might tackle these questions. This 
examination is set within a comparative analysis of marital surname 
change in Britain and Norway, using small qualitative samples. We find 
that while individualisation and new institutionalism offer partial 
explanations, bricolage offers a more adaptable viewpoint.   
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Introduction 
In 2016, 89% of married women in Britain had abandoned their own 
surname and taken their husband’s, according to a recent national 
survey1. This is little different from the 94% recorded in a 1995 
Eurobarometer survey (Valetas 1995). Even for the youngest age group 
in 2016, those respondents aged 18-34, nearly ¾ of married women had 
taken their husband’s name.  So entrenched is this practice that 
women’s name change is generally expected as the normal, and quite 
unremarkable, thing to do.   Transgression, even simple scrutiny, often 
leads to incomprehension, anger and conflict with male partners or 
relatives (Thwaites 2014). All this is despite the fact that, legally, married 
women - like anyone else in Britain - can use whatever name they want.   
Most countries in western Europe and North America follow the same 
pattern, although there are some exceptions2.  
 
Names are at the heart of our individual identity, and surnames in 
particular signal social, civil and legal status (Pilcher, 2016). So why do 
nearly all married women in Britain choose to change their identity 
through taking their husband’s surname and, what is more, change to a 
symbolically inferior and subordinate position. For in Britain the history 
of female name change upon marriage is a deeply patriarchal history. 
Under the medieval legal doctrine of coverture a wife, her children, and 
her property, became the husband’s possession. When hereditary 
surnames emerged, married women were left with no surname at all 
and lost named identity, except ‘wife of-‘. By the later Middle Ages 
theological and legal arguments began to see marriage as conferring 
spiritual unity as well as property union.   The married woman, in theory, 
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came to share the surname of her husband as a symbol of this unity. But 
in practice, the name change represented the wife’s subordinated 
identity and legal status. Coverture remained embedded in English 
common law right up to the late nineteenth century, when the Married 
Woman’s Property Acts from 1870 to 1893 allowed wives control over 
their own property.  
 
Nonetheless the practice of women’s surname change on marriage 
remained.  We might see this as an example of informal ‘lived law’, not 
formally legislated but socially prescriptive. The state has eased the 
practice of this lived law however - women have a special right, but not a 
requirement, to change their surname on marriage. Legally this change 
is effected by the marriage itself and the marriage certificate is an 
adequate document for all purposes, including acquiring a new passport. 
(The same rights were extended to same sex civil partners in 2004 and 
same sex married spouses in 2013). All other name changes require a 
Deed Poll or similar administrative measures to legally effect a change, 
including husbands who wish to adopt the wife’s surname, and spouses 
who opt for a joint name. As Finch (2008: 716) puts it, the women’s 
name change becomes ‘bureaucratic routine’.  
 
This is a striking example of the survival of tradition. How is it that a 
practice emerging from patriarchal history and redolent of women’s 
subordination to men has become so embedded in an age of women’s 
emancipation and de-traditionalisation? We pursue this question 
through the lens of comparative analysis with Norway, which displays an 
even more spectacular example of the paradoxical survival of women’s 
 4 
surname change. For Norway is regularly ranked among the top 4 
countries on various indices of gender equality3, reflecting strong 
equality norms, comprehensive ‘women-friendly’ public policy, and the 
virtual disappearance of any female homemaker role (Kitterød and 
Rønsen 2013). In addition nearly all couples cohabit before marriage, 
often over the long term and many as parents (Syltevik 2010). At that 
stage women partners keep their own surname. Nevertheless most go 
on to marry and then change name. Norway also shows a less 
patriarchal history of married women’s surnames than in Britain. A 
country of small, independent farmers right into the late nineteenth 
century, hereditary surnames were not used. Last names reflected a 
mixture of patronymic and locational elements, usually the father’s first 
name and a farm name. Perhaps reflecting their key role within this 
peasant economy, married women kept their own names – although 
these might change if they changed farm. Only by the mid 19th century 
did wives in the urban bourgeoisie begin to adopt the supposedly more 
sophisticated ‘continental’ model of taking the husband’s name. This 
symbol of modernity received state support in the Names Act of 1923, 
through which hereditary surnames became mandatory and, as part of 
this, married women and any children were required to take the 
husband’s surname (NOU 2001). Apparently strictly enforced, the state 
had created a new, more patriarchal, tradition5. The Names Act was 
revised in women’s favour in 1949 (they could keep their own name 
given the husband’s consent) and in 1964 (consent was no longer 
needed, though application would have to be made before the 
wedding). By 1979 the Act was made gender neutral with the 
presumption that spouses would keep their own names.  Finally, in 
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2003, double-barrelled and other joint names became permissible, and 
the same naming rights were extended to cohabiting couples living 
together for 2 years or having children together. 
 
Despite this relaxation of patriarchal legislation, and despite the 
ideology and practice of gender equality, 80% of Norwegian women 
marrying between 1980 and 2003 (the date of the last nationally 
representative survey) took their husband's surname (Wiecek 2003). 
Conversely, 97% of men kept their name. In fact, controlling for age (as 
older women are less likely to take their husband’s name, and age at 
marriage has increased) the likelihood of women in Norway taking their 
husband’s name actually increased between 1980 and 2003 (Noack and 
Wiik 2008). This is all the more surprising given that it was only the name 
changers who had to take positive action and inform the state 
authorities of their naming decision. As in Britain keeping your own 
name on marriage needs no action at all, but this was a minority practice 
for women in both countries. There is, however, one difference from 
Britain which perhaps reflect greater gender equality in Norway. About 
half of women name changers in Norway kept their own name as a 
middle name – which functions as a secondary surname. As we shall see, 
this is rare in Britain.  There may also have been some decline in the 
proportion of ‘changers’ since 2003, as suggested by qualitative 
evidence (Grønstad 2015) and by more recent register data from 
Sweden – which shares an almost identical legal history for marital 
naming (Statistika Centralbyrån 2013)4.   
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In this article we attempt to understand the role of tradition in relation 
to women’s marital surname change. Is this persistent tradition just 
some sort of inertia or drag, which will slowly disappear as modernity 
progresses, or does this fulfil more contemporary roles? Are women and 
men just dupes to tradition, or alternatively do they use tradition to 
further their aims?  How do some traditions remain embedded in an age 
of supposed detraditionalisation, where agency is widely assumed to 
play a greater role in allowing more personal choice, and adherence to 
tradition has supposedly atrophied? We have identified three 
approaches in pursuing these questions. First is individualisation theory, 
a dominant frame of reference in family sociology but currently subject 
to considerable critique. Hence our interest in assessing the potential of 
two more recent applications to family sociology - new institutionalism 
and institutional bricolage (Carter and Duncan 2018). We examine the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of these three perspectives in 
explaining married women’s surname change in Britain and Norway, 
using small qualitative samples.  We turn first to outline these three 
approaches. 
 
Three approaches to tradition 
 
Individualisation 
The focus of individualisation theory rests firmly on detraditionalisation: 
the progressive disappearance of tradition under the conditions of late 
modernity. Consequently structuring social forms like class and family 
have atrophied.  Notoriously, in the word of Ulrich Beck, the family 
became a ‘zombie category’ – still existing but without any real life 
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(Beck, 2002, 204). This assumption is buttressed by a rather one-sided 
view of agency as mainly discursive - reflexive, purposeful and individual. 
People, and women especially, are increasingly freed from tradition and 
are both able and compelled to ‘decide for themselves’ how to conduct 
their personal lives in a ‘search for new ways of living’ according to Beck-
Gernsheim in her book ‘Reinventing the Family’ - indicatively subtitled 
‘In search of new lifestyles’ (2002: xii). Individual agency triumphs over 
social structure. There are therefore two roles available to marrying 
women deciding on their future surname (although we might ask why 
they marry in the first place, see Carter and Duncan 2018) – they can 
either be individualisers keeping their own name or laggards stuck in the 
habitual inertia of tradition.  
 
Critiques of individualisation theories are well rehearsed and need not 
detain us. Even by 2012, Dawson (2012) could categorize multifarious 
critiques as ‘modernist’, ‘interactionist’, or ‘discourse’. Or put more 
simply individualisation is nothing new and there is as much continuity 
as change, people cannot exist in isolation but are connected and 
relational, and individualisation just reflects a neo-liberal political 
agenda. Others have pointed to a lack of empirical support for the 
assertions made (Duncan and Smith 2006, Smart 2007), coupled with an 
overemphasis on the exotic and a neglect of the unmarked majority 
(Brekhus, 1998). Beck-Gernsheim (2002), discussing married women’s 
choice of surname, gives an example. Assuming a priori that women 
increasingly reject taking their husband’s name, she takes this as 
indicating the decline of the ‘standard family’. This claim is based on 
speculative anecdote from ‘London’ and Germany. In fact as we have 
 8 
seen even among the youngest age group in Britain 80% of wives had 
taken their husband’s name by 2016, and a mere 2% wanted to keep 
their own name. In Germany, according to the 1995 Eurobarometer, 96 
per cent of married women had taken their husband’s name, with only 1 
per cent thinking it preferable to keep their own name.  
 
For our purposes here it is the strict binary between tradition and 
modernity that provides a major problem.  This prevents analysis of how 
people actively use tradition as part of modernity. Reducing tradition to 
a relic or a habit from the past negates the connection between the 
present and the ways in which traditions are made meaningful not just 
through their connections with the past but with their restatement in 
the present and signposting to the future.  
 
New Institutionalism 
In an influential paper Cherlin (2004) applied individualisation theory to 
American marriage - spouses pursued their own interests in marriage, 
rather than acting as a couple or following institutional precepts.  
Yodanis and Lauer (2014) critique this interpretation both theoretically 
and empirically, taking inspiration from the ‘new institutionalism’ of 
sociological economics (see also Lauer and Yodanis 2010). It is 
institutions that govern behaviours, not the individualised ‘rational 
economic man’ central to traditional economic theory, nor his 
sociological cousin – the reflexive and purposeful individualiser. 
Institutions are, however, made up of a bundle of self-reinforcing rules 
(both formal and informal) and taken-for-granted assumptions. 
Institutional routines and scripts usually lie beyond the conscious 
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scrutiny of individuals, so that alternatives are often not considered or 
even remain inconceivable: it is hard to imagine other possible ways of 
behaving and in any case there is usually only a limited number of viable 
alternatives. Tradition appears as natural. Even when people attempt to 
change institutions or develop alternatives they are subject to 
‘institutional isomorphism’: external coercive pressures, normative 
pressures, and the tendency to imitate others when faced with 
uncertainty. This is perhaps why fewer women end up keeping their own 
name than would, apparently, prefer to do so. Just 59% of British 
women would prefer their husband’s name, in another 2016 survey6, 
young as well as old, probably about 20% or more lower than what 
happens in practice.  All this promotes consistency and the status quo.  
 
This version of new institutionalism emphasises the persistence of 
tradition through institutional stability and resistance to change. This 
provides a more convincing account of why most women who marry in 
both Britain and Norway change to their husband’s name. Nevertheless, 
this is also a one-sided account, emphasising the power of institutional 
structures and norms. A critical question is now the opposite; how is it 
that some women do not follow these institutional givens and others 
discursively choose them? 
 
These two opposing approaches remind us of the ‘structure – agency 
problem’ - one-sided explanations focussing on either the creativity of 
individual agents or alternatively the power of institutional structures 
(King 2005). Research then lurches from one side to the other. Implicitly, 
the relatively large literature on women’s surname change in the USA 
 10 
follows this seesaw pattern (see Noack and Wiik 2008 for summary). 
Some studies emphasise the power of given tradition and normative 
cultural expectations (e.g. Twenge 1997). This is perhaps not surprising 
when, at the time, only 2% or so of married women in the USA had kept 
their own name. But other studies focus on the minority of female name 
‘keepers’, associated with factors like higher education, higher income, 
professional work, greater age, liberal family background, or 
subscription to gender equality (e.g. Johnson and Scheuble 1995).  
Noack and Wiik (2008) find much the same for Norway. Usually highly 
correlated, implicitly these factors are seen to promote some agency 
autonomy from institutional structure. An overall problem remains 
however - if some individuals can escape institutional structure, why 
can’t all – or do other people simply choose to follow structure? 
Conversely, if structures are so strong, how can some escape? 
 
Institutional bricolage 
With a focus on how people use culture and tradition, the bricolage 
approach sidesteps this structure-agency problem. People generally 
possess limited cognitive and social energy. When faced with some new 
situation or problem they tend to adapt what they already know, or 
what is easily available, to arrive at some more or less adequate 
solution.  New social arrangements are pieced together using diverse 
parts of available existing norms, values and practices. While this 
adaption is often naturalised as tradition, it is not necessarily unthinking 
or uncritical; some elements of tradition might come under discursive 
scrutiny and may be changed or abandoned.  This framework has been 
used quite widely in some parts of social science, in business studies for 
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example. Managers and entrepreneurs rarely act through long term, 
rational planning and resource allocation. Rather they improvise plans 
from what they know at the time, often using well-known ‘rules of 
thumb’, and so create ‘something from nothing’ (Baker and Nelson 
2005). 
 
Cleaver (2012) develops this general idea in her theorisation of 
‘institutional bricolage’ as applied to development planning.  For 
bricolage is not only a matter of individual adaptive behaviour, but also 
underlies the emergence of new institutions, both formal and informal. 
And, as new institutionalism describes, institutions can ‘do the thinking’ 
on behalf of individuals.  This has several implications. First, Cleaver 
emphasises that new arrangements are most likely to succeed if they are 
bestowed with the legitimacy of ‘tradition’. This is because cooperation 
and assent from others is necessary if the new arrangement is going to 
work. Moreover, if these arrangements are going to have some long-
term future, they must become normalized to the people who practice 
them.  People can more easily take part if new arrangements are 
recognisably traditional - for then they will know what to expect and 
have a guide on how they should act. In addition, assent and 
cooperation are most likely if the new arrangements are generally 
accepted as a ‘right’ and ‘sensible’ way of doing things, even better if 
any new adaption appears ‘natural’.  Further scrutiny becomes 
unnecessary. This occurs through processes of conferring continuity and 
authority to the new or adapted arrangements.  Artefacts, symbols, 
mechanisms, discourses, and sanctioned power relationships are 
borrowed from other settings and other times. This borrowing also 
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means that meanings may ‘leak’ from one time and setting to another. If 
pre-existing tradition is lacking, it may even be invented; indeed it is all 
the more likely to be invented in times of rapid change when the 
crumbling of old certainties threatens both legitimacy and ontological 
security (Hobsbawn 1983).    
 
Second, bricolage is a socially unequal process. Whilst everyone is 
potentially capable of being a bricoleur, some are able to command 
more resources to make adaptations work in their favour. These are not 
only material resources, command over things like the means of 
production, but also authoritative resources: command over people, for 
example in organisations and institutions (Giddens, 1984). Authoritative 
resources include moral world views which are usually strongly 
gendered, raced, and socially stratified ideas about the proper behaviour 
and the rightful place of individuals with different social identities. The 
more resourced will often be more able to adapt or to influence 
adaptations to work in their favour, and to find social assent, while the 
adaptive ability of others is limited.  At the extreme some may have no 
capacity to develop adaptive arrangements at all.   This implies the 
privileging of pre-existing patterns of authority and advantage. 
 
 Bricolage is deeply social, impregnated with collective moralities, ideas 
and expectations, often hidden and non-reflexive, and usually unequal. 
Tradition, what has gone before, becomes crucial as a resource and 
legitimating device. The decline of pre-existing traditions will stimulate 
re-traditionalisation and the invention of traditions. Rather than the high 
energy, high stress and high-risk experiments of the individualised actor, 
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the social bricoleur seeks the low energy, low stress and safer option of 
adapting ‘tradition’ (see Duncan 2011). The resulting practices are 
therefore neither completely 'modern' nor completely traditional, but 
are rather a dynamic mixture of the two.    
 
We will now go on to explore these three conceptual approaches further 
in the context of marital surname change in Britain and Norway. 
 
Methods 
Our discussion depends on combining three small semi-structured 
interview samples in Britain (2 samples from 2010 and 2014, with a total 
of 38 respondents) and Norway (2016, 27 respondents). The 2014 British 
and 2016 Norwegian samples were for a joint project on weddings, and 
were restricted to people who had recently married, or were going to do 
so. The 2010 British sample with 23 respondents concerned young 
women’s ideas about partnering and marriage. In this sample only 8 
were married or planning marriage; indeed 3 were single (the remainder 
cohabiting or living apart together). In all three samples name change 
was a substantive topic but for these latter respondents name change 
was more hypothetical.  Ethical approval was granted by the authors’ 
employing institutions, although no ethical problems presented and 
respondents were happy to talk about their actual, planned or expected 
weddings. 
 
Respondents were recruited through snowballing in locations in Kent, 
Hampshire and Yorkshire in England, and in two Norwegian cities. 
Recruitment took different routes; in Kent, snowballing was initiated 
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through the manager of a particular wedding venue, in Yorkshire and 
Hampshire personal contacts provided an initial starting point, and in 
Norway recruitment started through Facebook and other social media. 
Snowball sampling can restrict recruitment to those in restricted 
networks who have certain defining characteristics. However, with 4 
researchers7 and a number of snowballing routes, the samples were 
reasonably diverse in terms of marital history. Nearly all respondents 
were under 35, although three interviewees in the 2014 British sample 
were in their 50s and marrying for a second time. Partly because of the 
aims of the 2010 British sample, there were more women than men. 
With one exception, all participants were White. While the British 
sample was reasonably diverse in terms of occupation and education, 
the Norwegian sample was biased towards the better educated. See 
Duncan and Carter 2018 and Ellingsæter 2018 for details. 
 
We used conversational, semi-structured interviews, with an open 
initial question (‘Tell me about your wedding starting wherever you 
like’). This gave participants the opportunity to identify themes and 
issues of particular relevance to them, and to direct the narrative and 
frame it in their own terms of reference (Mason and Davies, 2011). 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and participant names 
pseudonymised. The Norwegian sample was transferred to NVIVO.  
 
The small sample sizes, and their ad hoc combination, partly reflect 
financial and time constraints. Similarly, we did not have the resources 
to establish sub-samples from minority groups. However, we are not 
concerned to make descriptive or statistical population level correlations 
or inferences. Rather, we are concerned with individual motivations for, 
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and understandings of, surname change on marriage. Consequently, we 
employed an ‘intensive’ research methodology that would better 
capture the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of these processes (Sayer, 1992), as well as 
providing descriptive information. Analysis was grounded on reading 
each interview transcript, identifying respondents’ discursive 
rationalisations of their ideas and decisions about marriage and 
weddings, including name change (see Carter and Duncan 2016). Using 
this methodology we can make some moderate analytical 
generalisations (see Payne and Williams, 2005) at least for ‘majority’ 
weddings between heterosexual partners. There remains a need for 
research on particular ‘minority’ ethnic, religious and same-sex 
weddings and also for wider, ‘extensive’ research on overall patterns of 
wedding and marriage behaviour, including name change.  
 
 
Understanding marital name change in Britain and Norway 
There were different levels of scrutiny of marital name change, ranging 
from the uncritical taken-for-granted of tradition to critical rejection. 
Some participants more consciously used tradition for displaying family. 
We will describe these categories in turn. 
 
Taking tradition for granted: habitual agency  
Taking the husband’s name was often just taken for granted by the 
English respondents. ‘Obviously’ as Penny said, she would change her 
name. When asked to explain further, these respondents frequently 
called upon a language of convention, tradition and given social norms:  
‘it’s traditional and conventional’ (Eleanor); name change was ‘the right 
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thing to do’ (Lucy). For Jess the meaning of her wedding was ‘that I’ll 
take my partner’s surname. And stand by my vows’. Moreover, name 
change denoted proper family status: ‘it’s just what’s expected as you 
become a family and that family have one name’ (Zoe).  For some 
participants, taking the husband’s name was not only assumed and 
unquestioned, it was desired and eagerly awaited. As Abigail put it, ‘I’m 
so looking forward to being a wife and having my surname changed’. For 
Adele – who was single- changing her name would not simply be ‘the 
done thing’ but in addition ‘it’s nice to have to be able to say ‘husband’ 
and take someone else’s name and call yourself Mrs’.  
 
In our sample this ‘naturalised’ view of marital surname change was 
much less common in Norway, restricted to two couples who were 
actively religious and, exceptionally, had not cohabited before marriage. 
Lars considered it “tradition” and “normal” that the bride takes her 
husband's last name: ‘That's how it has been with two of my brothers 
who have married, and in the rest of the family’.  For Lars two different 
surnames would be odd and unnatural, while his name would show 
family unity:  
‘when you marry you become one …and I think it's [name change} 
also a part of establishing a family, that you create your new 
family’.   
Similarly Kristin -the only woman in the Norway sample taking her 
husband’s surname and completely abolishing her own- felt that 
husband and wife should have the same surname.   Her partner Knut, in 
a separate interview, said it was more ‘natural’ for them to have just his 
and, indeed, their parents had done the same.  
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Scrutiny of this taken-for-granted tradition was not entirely lacking and 
some English respondents had considered the possibility of a joint   
hyphenation of both partners’ names. For most of the English sample, 
however, this was a brief and negative scrutiny which served only to 
confirm traditional name change. As Michelle dismissively put it: ‘I think 
double barrelled names are a bit crap’. A couple of women respondents 
were initially more enthusiastic. But without recourse to alternative 
narratives, negotiation with unenthusiastic male partners was one-sided. 
Husbands could claim the legitimacy of established tradition, while 
alternatives appeared contrived. And what tradition does exist in Britain 
for ‘double-barrelled’ names is de-legitimising, negatively associated 
with the English upper class. Susan had considered a joint hyphenated 
name but she ‘didn’t like the sound if it either way round’. Furthermore: 
[her fiancé] said it meant a lot more to him like me having his 
surname and as I wasn’t particularly bothered either way I 
thought- nice gesture to take the name and kind of do the 
traditional thing. 
In contrast in Norway the tradition of wives keeping their own names as 
a subsidiary surname is well established.  For example Lars’ partner, 
Line, wanted to take his name. Nevertheless she had kept her surname 
as middle name, ‘because it's a big part of my life and my family’.  
 
Some of the English husbands made it a condition of marriage that their 
wives took their name. Mandy gives a striking example: 
‘I actually didn’t want to change my name but …he said but if that 
hadn’t changed there would have been no point getting married 
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[...] he said the wedding would have meant nothing if I hadn’t 
changed my name’.  
Similarly for Derek, the name change ‘was one of [his] criteria’ for 
getting married. He was glad Alison had become his wife for they were 
now ‘Mr and Mrs (his surname)’ as proudly celebrated on the wedding 
card. This traditional assumption of his partner’s symbolic subordination 
as wife was, however, given a modern twist: he was offering the status 
of ‘Mrs’.  As he continued: ‘so, you know, I wanted to make you feel 
special, I think, and be a Mrs instead of just being a live-in partner’. At 
the same time this allowed him entry to a particular male status: 
‘And a lot of- all our friends are pretty much couples that have 
either been married for years or they've recently got married and I 
think… I wanted to be part of that club.’ 
As Thwaites (2014) concludes the name change can create a symbolic 
continuation of traditional masculine identity as family head and 
authoritative presence.   
 
From the lens of individualisation theory, these respondents have not 
been freed from tradition by the conditions of late modernity or, if they 
have, they have not responded for some reason. Women, who 
supposedly have most to gain from the detraditionalisation of the 
family, accept and maintain its traditions – at times with some 
enthusiasm.  Men retain patriarchal family power. New institutionalism 
provides a fuller description of this re-traditionalisation process. Given 
scripts mean that alternatives remain unconsidered or discounted while 
the institutional isomorphism of others’ expectations and coercion 
obstructs departure from the norm. The idea of a wife keeping her own 
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name might not only deeply upset some family members; others would 
simply not understand. Some husbands insist on their name as surname 
or, in Norway, the dominant last name.  A bricolage perspective would 
elaborate this explanation by emphasising tradition as a guide to action 
in what is – to these respondents - a new situation. Taking the husband’s 
name is the easiest solution and can make the best claim to trouble free 
legitimacy. Moreover, others – husbands and relatives - have greater 
authoritative resources in the absence of any convincing alternative 
narrative. Nothing can be worse than a new arrangement that appears 
socially contrived. Far better if something different appears familiar, is 
easily recognised, and appears endowed with self-validating truth.  
 
Using tradition: doing and displaying family 
So far we have looked at those respondents who were more passive 
bearers of tradition. But many respondents were more actively involved 
in choosing their name. Rather than accepting tradition they used it – 
which for most meant taking the husband’s name. For, if our names are 
at the heart of our personal identity, then name change can be used as a 
handy tool for displaying a new family situation. One of our English 
respondents, Ruth, puts this well in reflecting on her imminent marriage: 
‘I’ve always imagined I would change my name [...] because it 
makes you feel that you’re one; you’re part of the same thing, 
you’re the same family and that’s - it’s a really symbolic- 
powerfully symbolic way of saying we’re together. 
For people do not only have to work at ‘doing family’ (Morgan 1996) 
they also have to display this work. As Finch (2007: 66) puts it, ‘the 
meaning of one’s actions has to be conveyed to and understood by 
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relevant others as characteristic of family’.  The ‘powerfully symbolic’ 
change of name allows Ruth to help establish family connectedness and 
belonging  (what she feels) and to display this ‘proper’ family to others 
(what this says).  Claire put this even more baldly:  
‘I’d like them to know that we were a family and I think names is 
quite a good way of doing that.’ 
 
Finch sees this display function as particularly important as de-
traditionalisation proceeds, and families become more diverse and 
fragmented. People living in new, sometimes challenging and often 
more complicated arrangements, need all the more to display that they 
are ‘proper family’. Alison, an older respondent in the English sample, 
gives a good example. Married early as a pregnant teenager, she 
followed accepted tradition and took her husband’s surname. This 
unhappy ‘shotgun’ marriage soon dissolved into estrangement and 
divorce, but she kept her ex-husband’s surname so that she and her 
children had the same surname. By this means she was able to display 
her own identity as mother, and that the children belonged to her. On 
her re-marriage, and now with independent grown-up children, this use 
of her first husband’s name was not only redundant but an oppressive 
reminder of her first marriage. Her second name change, displaying 
another identity, helped bury this unhappy past. This was no uncritical 
acceptance of tradition, however; she consciously examined the 
implications of name change ‘for a woman’ and had even considered 
reverting to her long lost maiden name. But as we have seen Derek, her 
new husband, saw Alison taking his name, becoming ‘Mr and Mrs’, as 
one of his criteria for marriage. So using this handy tool can have a flip 
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side, taking the husband’s name also ‘leaks’ a powerfully symbolic 
message about male dominance.  
 
None of the men in the Norwegian sample stated directly that their 
wives’ name change was a precondition for marriage.  Indeed the 
appellations ‘Mrs.’ (Fru) and ‘Mr. and Mrs’ (Herr og Fru) disappeared 
decades ago. Nonetheless, most kept their own name unchanged and in 
some cases argued strongly that their names should be the dominant 
last name for both partners. This seemed to depend on prioritising male 
identity. For Sebastian his ‘considerable pressure’ was justified by 
patrilineal continuity - his surname had been in the family for 100-150 
years passed down through first sons, so it was important that the name 
would continue. In compensation his wife could have her ‘big wedding‘. 
Similarly Nicolai had a ‘pretty clear idea’ that he would not renounce his 
name since ‘it's like a bit of tradition related to it, and it comes from a 
small place in western Norway’. His wife, Nina, would rather have kept 
her own name; ‘names are so important for identity, so I did not give up 
my whole name… I think it's bad enough that my name did not come 
last, but I gave in on that’. She had asked herself afterwards ‘why did I 
not quarrel about it’, believing this was because Nicolai ‘was a man’.   
Unlike the English respondents, however, both Sebastian and Nikolai 
took their wife’s name as middle name. Guro and Gregor were using 
name change in a similar way – but in the opposite direction. Both would 
take her (Guro’s) name as last name, although keeping Gregor’s as a 
middle name. Their reasoning was twofold - she had a special family 
name that she was eager to keep, while he had an immigrant name that 
he wanted to lose.    
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Many respondents cited the perceived necessity of having the same 
name for all family members. This was seen as important because: ‘you 
feel more part of the family unit if you’ve all got the same name’ 
(Catriona). In both national samples a common surname symbolising 
family as a unit was primarily associated with having children, not the 
couple as such. So, for Jane, the wedding ‘means I get the same name as 
my children’ or as Darren explained, his wedding would mean that 
‘Mummy can have the same surname. And, it means we can also have 
another baby afterwards’. In Norway Rita and her partner Rune wanted 
children, so a common name would mean ‘we can call us family’. But in 
contrast to the English respondents this common family name would 
include her existing surname as middle name, otherwise she would ‘lose 
a part of herself’. Eirin had been struggling between the ‘feminist me’ 
and her husband who wanted them to have the same name. But this 
was ‘not urgent at least not until you get have children and have to 
decide their names…then it is okay to have the same name’. Brita also 
had similar problems. She would probably change her name if they were 
to have children, but she was very fond of her last name and was afraid 
of ‘losing a bit of myself’ 
 
A family identity is seen as based on a shared name, which shows that 
the family ‘belong’ together. But changing name can also be used to 
reverse this belonging. In both countries a few female respondents had 
changed their name because they thought their name was ‘boring’ or, as 
we have seen for Alison, a way of burying a painful past and displaying a 
new, fresh identity. So for Shirley ‘losing [her surname] isn’t a very big 
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deal for me’ because the name belonged to her stepfather with whom 
she was not close.  Similarly Frida had taken her husband’s ‘exclusive’ 
and ‘nice’ surname. Nonetheless she kept her ‘common surname’ (as her 
husband put it) as the family middle name as a link to her father and to 
‘hold on to what is mine’.   
 
When the family do not have a common name, this supposedly leads to 
‘confusing the children’ as Michelle claimed. She explained:  
 ‘I know there’s a woman at work that’s got her own surname and 
then her kids have got her husband’s surname and it’s all a bit 
complicated.’  
Or as Claire put it: ‘the kids won’t know whether they’re coming or going 
and the teachers don’t know [...] I think it’s a bit confusing’. This echoed 
the responses from other English participants, who saw the use of 
different surnames within a family as problematic, confusing and 
difficult. This view was not echoed, however, by the children with 
different surnames interviewed by Davies (2011); they were rarely 
confused by the situation and were well able to identify family 
members, connections and disconnections. This suggests that this 
‘confusion’ is an adult concern - rather than ‘confusing the children’, 
surname non-conformity creates adult discomfort because of normative 
and moral disruption.   
 
Conveying the ‘meaning of one’s actions’ to others, and gaining their 
understanding that these actions mean good family, is not a seamless, 
uncontested process. In particular, new and adapted arrangements must 
be accepted and validated by others. This made adopting the husband’s 
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name all the more likely; creating family unity through a joint name, or 
using the women’s name, was rarely considered in the English sample. 
Indeed, such alternatives may be morally suspect: two participants 
suggested that women who do not adopt their husband’s surnames are 
actually less committed, or the relationship is seen as temporary. They 
were not able to successfully display proper family, whatever their 
actual practices. As Hermione explained: ‘me Auntie’s married and she’s 
kept her own name and I can- it doesn’t feel as permanent I think’. Zoe, 
still single, echoed this sentiment:  
‘I think like also if you’ve kept your name it be kind of like saying 
I’m not really that committed to you.’ 
If, for these English participants, taking the husband’s name represents 
belonging and connectedness with family and is a way of doing and 
displaying family, then keeping the women’s name must be the 
opposite: a rejection of connections, commitment and new family 
identity. This feeling was not directly expressed in the Norwegian 
sample, probably because of the widespread practice of using the wife’s 
surname as a secondary, middle, name. 
 
How does this more active use of marital name change connect with the 
three conceptual approaches outlined earlier? For individualisation 
theory, these respondents might perhaps be the classic reflexive agents 
creating their own biographies – the only trouble is they have chosen 
tradition, not ‘new ways of living’. This approach confuses what people 
can potentially do with what they actually do. The new institutional 
approach has little to say on this active use of tradition – perhaps these 
respondents show in more detail how institutional isomorphism works. 
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But it is the bricolage approach that deals with these cases most 
convincingly in its emphasis on adaption from tradition as a resource in 
handling new situations, and its value in gaining legitimacy. Cognitive 
and social energy are minimised, difficult calculations and negotiations 
with others about what is proper family are avoided.  
 
Prioritising individual identity: rejecting tradition 
Few respondents in Britain rejected conventional name changing 
practices altogether, although more did so in Norway. Among the 
English respondents recently married Josie and Mike both wanted to 
keep their original surnames. They had completely broken with British 
tradition and created a compound name by deed poll. Symbolically, the 
female surname was placed first. Lauren (a feminist academic) did not 
anticipate marrying and while she could see the appeal of sharing a 
family name with partner and children this was ‘something I definitely 
wouldn’t do’. The alternative of a double-barrelled name ‘just seems 
sort of really tacky’. Rebecca was more hesitant: 
‘I think I would like to keep me own name … I need to be me and I 
think like I wouldn’t want to lose who I am. It’s took me so long to 
make myself to like who I am… I think I probably would like to 
keep my own name.’ 
Continuity of identity was the most important consideration for 
Rebecca, and some Norwegian respondents put this more strongly. For 
Anna ‘my name is to be my name, I want to keep it. And be who I am’, 
Furthermore she would feel ‘claustrophobic’ if incorporated into her in-
laws family's name. Caroline felt the same:   
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‘I am who I am, so I have no need to change my name.  I have an 
identity feeling to my own name that I want to continue having’ 
Hanna emphasised individual choice, giving primacy to ‘the nicest name’ 
She went on: 
‘it should not be automatic for the woman to take the name of 
the man, I think it's nice that we have come so far that you to a 
large extent can choose the name you wish to choose’ 
Some others in both countries, with what we might call a ‘practical 
feminism’, kept their original name for work or other practical purposes.  
 
Two Norwegian women respondents articulated more explicit feminist 
objections.  For Anna name change 
‘says a lot about the patriarchal culture we have had, that it is 
always women who, as a rule take the man's name’ 
Oda held similar views, if expressed more colourfully - conventional 
practice ‘sucks’. She criticised women who changed their names for not 
thinking about what a name means, there was a reason why men do not 
change, and she criticised men for continuing the “weird” practice of 
imposing their names on other people without being willing to change 
their own.  
 
The lack of such an alternative narrative for many other participants 
allows the patriarchal practices of women’s self-negation, and symbolic 
male dominance, to leak from past tradition into contemporary family. 
Even if alternative notions are available, they have to be successfully 
negotiated. Cathy gave a striking demonstration. Taking a feminist 
viewpoint she refused marriage, instead organising an unconventional 
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‘non-wedding’ to celebrate commitment to her continuing live apart 
partner.  But nonetheless the centrepiece of this event was traditional 
name change legitimated through a narrative of romance: Cathy publicly 
presented her partner with a deed poll whereby she had adopted his 
name. As she explained: 
‘It’s like a symbolic thing…Internationally recognised. So I wanted 
to do that as a gesture of my love, really, my commitment so I did 
that as a surprise. I mean, he was very, very pleased about that ... I 
never thought I would ever change my name.’ 
 
The three conceptual approaches react in different ways. For 
individualisation theory, at last there are reflexive women discursively 
breaking free from tradition and creating their own biographies. The 
trouble is, statistically, they are few in number. New institutionalism 
presents a mirror image; these are women who have somehow escaped 
institutional scripts and isomorphism. From a bricolage perspective, 
these respondents are discursively critical of tradition and, with access 
to an alternative narrative, can formulate alternatives. However this 
examination is only likely to be partial. As we saw with Cathy, other 
elements of tradition will remain unexamined and reproduced.  
 
Conclusion 
Nearly all the English women respondents were going to change their 
name on marriage or had already done so. Some welcomed losing their 
name. Most English men simply assumed their wives would take their 
name and that they would keep their own.  In some case marriage was 
conditional on this change. Only two unmarried women intended to 
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keep their own names, while just one couple chose a joint, hyphenated 
name. Not a single English respondent talked about taking the women’s 
surname as family name. This picture fits in with evidence from the 2016 
national survey discussed above.  
 
Despite a pervasive culture of gender equality, the majority of 
Norwegian women were also going to, or had, taken their husband's 
surname. However, most kept their own name as a secondary, middle, 
surname so as to preserve their own identity. Furthermore, in 7 of the 
21 couples women were name 'keepers’, and a few male partners placed 
their own name in the secondary, middle, and position.  There was also 
greater scrutiny in the Norwegian sample, with more expression of 
ambivalence, negotiation and even regret. This suggests some 
movement from the latest survey evidence from 2003 in which female 
name change was dominant. While most men expected to keep their 
own name, wives are largely left to make their own decision. However, 
we might expect this more democratic and gender equal behaviour in a 
sample of young, mostly well-educated and middle class respondents 
living in cities, as suggested by Noack and Wiik (2008) in their survey 
analysis. What we can conclude however is that an alternative practice 
to simply changing to the husband’s name or keeping their own is 
available to Norwegian brides – placing their own name as a middle, 
secondary, surname.  
 
 
How successful were the three explanatory approaches in accounting for 
these contrasting mixtures of tradition and new?  With a focus firmly on 
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detraditionalisation, individualisation theory can only see those women 
who simply expect to change their surname on marriage – the majority - 
as laggards, stuck in tradition for some reason. It is particularly impotent 
in explaining why some women who change their surname apparently 
choose to do so.  Those few women who reflexively decide to keep their 
original name fit this model best, although these remain a minority in 
both countries.   New institutionalism is the other side of the coin. This 
approach is more convincing in accounting for the habitual agency of 
low or non-reflexive name changers who just follow tradition, but it is 
unable to say much about how some women escape institutional limits, 
take alternative courses of action, or actively use name change tradition 
in displaying family. These two approaches remind us of the ‘problem of 
structure and agency’ in social science respectively emphasising either 
the creative power of agents or the determining power of structure.  The 
bricolage approach was the most adaptable of the three. This was 
particularly suited to explaining why and how people can actively use 
name changing traditions in managing family identity and display. But in 
addition this approach provides explanations of women’s more habitual 
acceptance of the tradition of changing their surname on marriage, as 
well as why some might keep their own name. This relative explanatory 
success depends on the basic idea that people use tradition in differing 
ways in adapting to some new situation. Tradition might provide an easy 
way forward, but it too needs adapting in the new situation, and this 
leaves space for discursive examination and invention. Similarly 
institutions do not only govern behaviour and impose tradition, but are 
themselves created in tackling change through using or even inventing 
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tradition. Marital surname practices in Britain and Norway are neither 
traditional nor new, but are combinations of the two.  
 
Notes 
 1. A weighted online survey about wedding traditions, carried out 
between 29.12.2016 and 3. 1. 2017 by Opinium for the London Mint. 
927 of the 2003 respondents were married. The survey is not publicly 
available, but London Mint gave access to the authors.  
 
2. Notably in Spain 77% of married women kept their own name in 1995. 
In Italy and Belgium joint names are most common (see Valetas 2001). In 
Quebec a 1981 law makes it mandatory for married women to retain 
their own name, as does a 1983 law in Greece. Both have excited 
opposition from wives wishing to take their husband’s name 
 
3.  See for example the UN Gender Inequality Index and the World 
Economic Forum Global Gender Gap.  
 
4.  In Sweden the proportion of brides taking the husband’s name 
declined from 77% in 2003 to 64% in 2013.  Unfortunately, Statistics 
Norway does not publish aggregate data. 
 
5. Although marriage laws were in general more gender equal (Melby et 
al 2006). 
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6. A YouGov poll of name preferences, N= 1581 (816 female), weighted, 
carried out in September 2016. The survey has no information on 
outcomes. www.yougov.co.uk 
 
7. Two of the authors, Emily Garbutt, who helped with the Kent sub-
sample and Ragnhild Ekelund who undertook the Norway sample.  All 
interviewee names are pseudonyms. Translation from Norwegian by 
authors.  
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